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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 11-1223 
_____________ 
 
FLAKEWOOD ALAN TUCKER, III,  
 
         Appellant  
 
v. 
 
THOMAS JEFFERSON UNIVERSITY 
 
                                     
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 (D.C. Civ. No. 2-09-cv-01197) 
District Judge:  Honorable Edmund V. Ludwig 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 19, 2012 
____________ 
 
Before: VANASKIE, BARRY and CUDAHY,* 
 
Circuit Judges 
(Opinion Filed: June 7, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
CUDAHY, 
                                                 
*  Honorable Richard D. Cudahy, Senior Circuit Judge for the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.   
Circuit Judge 
  
 
This is a race discrimination case. Flakewood Alan Tucker III was employed as an 
ultrasound technician at Thomas Jefferson University Hospital through JeffTemps, the 
University’s temporary staffing affiliate. Tucker is a black male. During Tucker’s 
employment, Kellie Roberts, a patient registrar, filed a sexual harassment claim against 
Tucker. Roberts is a white female. After Tucker made several inappropriate comments 
and advances to Roberts, Roberts complained and he was later fired. Tucker then filed 
suit alleging his termination was motivated by racial discrimination. We affirm the 
district court’s finding that Tucker was not fired because he was black. 
Roberts complained to Richard Blob, an Associate Administrator in the Hospital’s 
Radiology Department, of Tucker’s inappropriate behavior. Blob is also white. Roberts 
complained that Tucker constantly touched her back, despite her repeated requests that he 
not do so. Roberts also claimed that Tucker had approached two other women, calling 
one “sexy and single” and making slurping noises at the other. Roberts identified three 
witnesses to Tucker’s actions: Ms. Basfield-Holland, Mr. Bolger and Ms. Burroughs, all 
of whom are black. When interviewed, they each supported Roberts’ version of events. 
Blob attempted to interview Tucker, but Tucker had remained absent from work after the 
complaint. Later, when University managers finally met with Tucker, he admitted to 
touching Roberts, but characterized the touching as friendly. Human Resources 
determined that Tucker violated the harassment policy and terminated his employment.  
Tucker sued, alleging unlawful racial discrimination under Title VII of the Civil 
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Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The district court 
granted summary judgment for the University, finding that Tucker could not establish a 
prima facie case of discrimination and, in addition, that the University had presented a 
valid non-discriminatory reason for the firing. Tucker provided no evidence of racial bias 
other than the fact that Roberts and Blob are both white.    
Tucker appeals, arguing the district court improperly granted summary judgment 
because he can establish a prima facie case of race discrimination and that the hospital’s 
proffered reason for his firing was pretextual.  The district court had jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331. As an appeal from the district court’s final order, we have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of motions for summary judgment is plenary, 
interpreting all facts in favor of Tucker. See Northview Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors 
Corp., 227 F.3d 78, 87-88 (3d Cir. 2000).  
I. 
On appeal, Tucker argues that there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie 
case of race discrimination under Title VII.  To establish a prima facie case of race 
discrimination, Tucker must show that he (1) is a member of a protected class; (2) was 
qualified for the position; (3) was terminated; and (4) the termination gave rise to an 
inference of discrimination based on race or gender. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973).  Once a plaintiff makes a prima facie case of 
discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to provide a legitimate, 
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nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Id. at 802. The district court correctly granted 
summary judgment for the University, because Tucker failed to make a prima facie case 
of race discrimination and, in any event, the University provided a legitimate reason for 
his firing.     
Tucker, as an African-American, is part of a protected class, who was terminated, and 
though it is not clear that he was qualified for his position, for the purposes of this review 
we will assume he was qualified. Tucker failed to show, however, that his employment 
was terminated under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination based 
on his race.  
Tucker claims he was fired simply because he is black. But the subjective belief that 
race played a part in his firing is insufficient.  See Jones v. School Dist. of Phila., 198 
F.3d 403, 414 (3d Cir. 1999). Tucker points to the alleged factual inadequacy of Blob’s 
investigation as support for the inference of race discrimination. But the adequacy of 
Blob’s factual findings is not at issue; the issue is whether discriminatory animus 
motivated Blob’s investigation and Tucker’s later firing.  See Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 
759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994).  Tucker has offered no evidence that gives rise to an inference of 
discrimination based on race. Tucker fails to identify any other employee who was 
outside of his protected class and was treated more favorably after a sexual harassment 
complaint. Tucker also fails to point to any policy or pattern of favorable treatment to 
non-black employees. The district court specifically noted that Tucker failed to offer any 
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evidence other than his subjective beliefs. Tucker has therefore failed to establish a prima 
facie case and his claim cannot survive summary judgment. 
 Even assuming that Tucker’s subjective belief could serve as the basis for a prima 
facie case of discrimination, the University provided a legitimate reason for his firing: 
Tucker’s sexual harassment of Roberts. Because the University provided a legitimate 
reason, the burden falls on Tucker to demonstrate that this reason was merely pretext. 
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. Yet, Tucker was unable to produce any 
evidence to cause the court to “disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reasons” 
or to believe that a discriminatory motive was more likely than not the determinative 
cause of the employer’s action. Jones, 198 F.3d at 413. Tucker must show that the 
University’s reasons for firing him are “weak, incoherent, implausible, or so inconsistent 
that ‘a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence.’” Sarullo v. 
U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 800 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1064 (2004) 
(quoting Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108-09 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
Clearly he cannot.  Roberts’ testimony and the statements of witnesses supported the 
conclusions of Blob, Human Resources and the district court that Tucker’s “conduct was 
not consented to and was sexual in nature and constituted sexual harassment.”  
II. 
Tucker alternatively argues that his case fits the “subordinate bias” theory or “mixed 
motive” theory. Both arguments are without merit.  
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The subordinate bias, or “cat’s paw,” theory states that an employer is liable for race 
discrimination when a nonbiased decision-maker is influenced by a biased managerial 
employee.  See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1193-94 (2011). Tucker’s 
subordinate bias argument lacks evidentiary support. Tucker does not show that Blob or 
Roberts are racially biased. Instead, like his prima facie discrimination argument above, 
Tucker argues two facts: Blob and Roberts are both white while he is black and Blob did 
not interview him. This does not show racial bias. 
Tucker’s mixed motive argument similarly lacks evidence. Mixed motive theory 
provides that discrimination exists if a plaintiff can show that race “was a motivating 
factor for any employment practice.”  Desert Palace, Inc. v. Coasta, 539 U.S. 90, 101 
(2003) (internal quotations omitted).  Again, Tucker offers no evidence that 
discrimination was a motivating factor in the decision to terminate him. Rather, he points 
to Blob’s failure to include a statement from Tucker in his investigation to show that the 
complaint was motivated by racial animus. The district court correctly found that the 
evidence Tucker relies on does not support this claim; indeed, the fact that the three 
witnesses were black tends to refute this theory. The mere fact that the accuser and the 
plaintiff are of different races does not support an inference of discrimination. Iadimarco 
v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 156 (3d Cir. 1999). 
Tucker’s reliance on the race of his accuser and the adequacy of Blob’s investigation 
alone cannot carry the day. Tucker was investigated and fired because he sexually 
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harassed a female coworker. For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is 
AFFIRMED. 
 
